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PATENT OFFICE COHORTS
MICHAEL D. FRAKES† & MELISSA F. WASSERMAN††
ABSTRACT
Concerns regarding low-quality patents and inconsistent decisions
prompted Congress to enact the first major patent reform act in over
sixty years and likewise spurred the Supreme Court to take a renewed
interest in substantive patent law. Because little compelling empirical
evidence exists as to what features affect the patent office’s granting
behavior, policymakers have been trying to fix the patent system
without understanding the root causes of its dysfunction.
This Article aims to fill at least part of this gap by examining one
factor that may affect patent examiners’ grant rates throughout their
tenures: the year in which they were hired by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). An examiner may develop a general
examination “style” in the critical early stages of her career that
persists even in the face of changes in application quality or patent
allowance culture at the agency. To the extent initial hiring
environments influence a newly hired examiner’s practice style,
variations in such initial conditions suggest examiners of different
hiring cohorts may follow distinct, enduring pathways with their
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examination practices. Consistent with this prediction, we find strong
evidence that the year an examiner was hired has a lasting effect on
her granting patterns over the course of her career. Moreover, we find
that the variation in the granting patterns of different PTO cohorts
aligns with observed fluctuations in the initial conditions faced by
such cohorts. By documenting the existence of cohort effects and by
demonstrating the importance of initial environments in explaining
certain long-term outcomes, this analysis holds various implications
for patent policy and the administrative state more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
There is widespread belief that the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) issues too many low-quality patents that unnecessarily
1
drain consumer welfare and stunt productive research. There is also a
general consensus that the Agency’s patentability determinations are
inconsistent across individual examiners—that is, the PTO’s decision
to grant a patent application is driven not only by the merits of the
invention but also by the proclivities of the examiner to whom the
2
application is randomly assigned. Concerns regarding patent quality
and inconsistent patentability decisions prompted Congress to enact
3
the first major patent reform act in over sixty years, spurred the
4
Supreme Court to take a renewed interest in substantive patent law,
5
and drove the PTO to hold its first Patent Quality Summit. Yet
because limited compelling empirical evidence exists as to what
features of the Agency affect its granting behavior, policymakers have
largely been trying to fix the patent system without understanding the
root causes of its pathology.
Building upon recent efforts by the Authors to fill these gaps and
to identify certain determinants of the Agency’s granting practices,
this Article investigates an additional, unexplored factor that may
substantially affect a patent examiner’s grant rate throughout her
6
tenure: the year the examiner was hired by the Agency. Management
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra Part I.
3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
4. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY
L.J. 181, 185 (2009).
5. U.S PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Patent Quality Summit, http://www.uspto.gov/
patent/initiatives/patent-quality-summit [http://perma.cc/RZ2J-SQLZ] (last updated June 2,
2015).
6. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV.
67, 96 (2013) [hereinafter Frakes & Wasserman, Agency Funding] (finding evidence that the
PTO’s fee structure biases a resource-constrained agency toward allowing patents); Michael D.
Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many
Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 617 (2015) [hereinafter
Frakes & Wasserman, Bad Patents] (finding evidence that the PTO’s inability to finally reject a
patent application biases a resource-constrained agency toward allowing patents); Michael D.
Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing
Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data, REV. ECON.
& STAT. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3–4) [hereinafter Frakes & Wasserman, Time
Allocated],
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2467262
[https://perma.cc/
D6GN-RML5] (finding evidence that patent examiners are facing binding time constraints that
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and labor scholars have long surmised that new hires are particularly
impressionable during the beginning of their employment. During
this initial period of training—be it formal or informal—new hires
may begin to develop distinct “styles” of practice that become
7
entrenched over time. This is especially true among workers like
patent examiners that operate within a reasonably wide range of
discretion. With this manner of learning in mind, the initial conditions
to which an examiner is exposed at the PTO are of potentially critical
importance. If a particular cohort of examiners is trained in a culture
characterized by a very permissive granting philosophy, it is possible
that this cohort will remain generally permissive throughout their
careers, even if future Agency heads aspire to instill a restrictive
attitude among the examiners corps. Accordingly, examiners may
exhibit “stickiness” in practices. Given that initial hiring
environments will likely vary over time, one might predict that
examiners of different hiring cohorts develop along diverging
pathways. In order to understand what drives both the levels of
observed grant rates themselves and the variability in such grant rates
across examiners, it is important to appreciate the existence and the
nature of such diverging cohort effects.
To empirically test whether the year an examiner is hired by the
PTO has a lasting effect on an examiner’s grant rate, we amassed a
rich database of previously unavailable data on individual patent
applications with the help of the National Center for Supercomputing
Applications at the University of Illinois. We also supplemented it
with information on examiners’ personnel histories (dating back to at
least 1992) that we received by filing various Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests with the PTO. This novel patent application
database comprises all 1,956,493 utility patent applications filed on or
after March 2001 that were published by the Agency prior to July
2012. With rich historical information on the examinations performed
by a number of overlapping cohorts of examiners, we then estimated
empirical specifications which allowed us to determine the
relationship between examiners’ grant rates and the hiring cohorts to
which they belonged. Notably, when estimating these specifications
we simultaneously controlled for a range of related factors that may
have also shaped grant rates through other mechanisms including,

biases them toward allowing patents and that an examiner’s grade level has explanatory power
as to her grant rate).
7. See infra Part I.
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importantly, the year in which the application itself was processed
and the experience level (in years) of the examiners at such times.
Ultimately, we find strong evidence of the existence of cohort
effects—that is, evidence that the year an examiner was hired has an
enduring effect on her granting patterns over the tenure of her career.
In addition, we find these effects to be large in magnitude—that is, we
estimate substantial differences in granting tendencies across the
various hiring cohorts. For example, after controlling for examiner
experience, general time trends, and other characteristics of the
applications in our sample, we find that examiners in the 1993 hiring
cohort have a mean grant rate roughly 11 percentage points (or 16
percent) higher than those examiners starting in the late 2000s.
In addition, we find that the observed differences in the mean
grant rates of the various examiner cohorts align with changes in both
the Agency’s culture regarding the allowance of patents as well as
new-hire training programs at the PTO. For instance, the decline in
the mean grant rate for those new cohorts starting in the mid-2000s
relative to the older cohorts within the Agency matches up with a
shift toward a more restrictive approach in the allowance of patents, a
cultural shift evidenced in part by the initiation of a new and
8
significant patent-quality initiative implemented in 2003/2004. To be
sure, the grant rate does fall somewhat among all examiners at this
time, including among the older cohorts. The new examiners hired by
the Agency after the implementation of the new quality programs,
however, set out on a granting trajectory that was systematically
lower than that of the older cohorts (again, even when accounting for
general annual trends and for differences in experience levels across
examiners).
Our results have a number of implications for both patent policy
and the administrative state. To begin, our results suggest that culture
promulgated from high-ranking officials during the beginning of an
examiner’s employment plays an important role in shaping her
behavior throughout her career. Thus, our analysis highlights the
import that agency-level preferences play in patent office outcomes.
Although the existing literature has recognized that patent examiners
operate with substantial discretion when applying the patentability
standards, it has failed to fully appreciate the role that Agency heads

8. See infra Part II.B.
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9

play in shaping and limiting this discretion. Our results also suggest
that, to the extent Agency leaders want to diminish the degree of
heterogeneity in patent office outcomes across examiners or reduce
the extent to which patent examiners allow non-meritorious
applications, they might face at least some degree of friction in light
of the stickiness of examiner behavior. That is, because what patent
examiners learn during the beginning of their employment can have
an enduring effect on their granting styles, a PTO that seeks to
achieve certain objectives may need to tailor its policies to address
differences in examiner cohorts. Finally, our results also provide
insight into topics that have long been of interest to scholars of the
administrative state. Cohort effects raise the costs of changing agency
policy today and in the future. Understanding how cohort dynamics
work to entrench agency policy over time also provides insight into
the effectiveness of agency monitors and the strategies available for
an agency to achieve its interests over a long-term horizon.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Part I briefly
describes the primary complaints that scholars and stakeholders have
registered against the patent system: the PTO issues too many lowquality patents, while also inconsistently applying the patentability
standards across examiners. Part II theorizes why the year an
examiner was hired may have a lasting influence on the examiner’s
granting proclivities. This Part also describes how the granting culture
of the Agency, as evidenced by the quality-assurance program of the
PTO and new-hire training, has varied over time. Part II also
delineates several testable hypotheses that will guide our empirical
analysis. Part III describes the dataset and the methodology
employed to test our hypotheses. The results of our empirical analysis
are presented in Part IV. In Part V, we explore some of the
implications of our findings for both the patent-quality debate and
administrative law more generally.

9. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1541, 1559–60, 1563–64 (2009) (discussing the difficulty the PTO has controlling
examiner conduct despite strict rules and oversight); Iain M. Cockburn, Samuel Kortum & Scott
Stern, Are All Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent Characteristics, and Litigation
Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 28 (Wesley M. Cohen &
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (noting that “substantial discretion is provided to examiners in
how they deal with applications”); Frakes & Wasserman, Agency Funding, supra note 6, at 74–
75.
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I. HARMS ASSOCIATED WITH INVALID PATENTS
AND INCONSISTENT PATENTABILITY DECISIONS
There is widespread agreement that the U.S. PTO grants too
many invalid patents—that is, the Agency grants patents to inventions
10
even though they fail to meet the patentability requirements. It is
undeniable that invalid patents impose a multitude of costs on
society. Erroneously issued patents can unnecessarily limit
11
competition by impeding new market entrants and by compromising
12
the business relations of those already in the market. Nonpracticing
entities or patent trolls can utilize invalid patents to opportunistically
13
extract licensing revenue from innovators. Erroneously issued
14
patents can also stunt follow-on innovation. More fundamentally,
invalid patents can result in supracompetitive pricing and diminished
15
quantity without providing society with any innovative benefit.
Observers have also criticized the PTO on the grounds that its
patentability decisions are inconsistent across examiners. That is,

10. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5–7 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/
innovationrpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/A5UB-8F6Q]; JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER,
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 3
(2008); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT
IT 11–13 (2004).
11. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that allowing patents on obvious
inventions can thwart competition); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of
Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 119–25 (2006).
12. Customers may be deterred from transacting with a company out of fear of a
contributory patent-infringement suit. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F.
Supp. 2d 514, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Dow alleged that Exxon had threatened to sue actual and
prospective Dow customers for patent infringement, even though Exxon allegedly had no goodfaith belief that Dow infringed the patent when Exxon made the threats and had allegedly
obtained the patent by inequitable conduct.” (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d
1470, 1472, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Leslie, supra note 11, at 125–27.
13. James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis is Really a Software Patent Crisis, WASH. POST
(Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-trollcrisis-is-really-a-software-patent-crisis [http://perma.cc/A5TQ-AZMP].
14. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal
Evidence from the Courts, 130 Q.J. ECON. 317, 318 (2015); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32 (1991)
(noting that overly broad patent protection “can lead to deficient incentives to develop second
generation products”); Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-on
Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome (Feb. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://economics.mit.edu/files/9778 [http://perma.cc/2H9B-GZ3A].
15. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office
Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817, 817 (2012).
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there is a growing concern that the decision to grant a patent
application is driven not only by the merits of the invention but also
by happenstance as to which examiner the application is randomly
16
assigned. A PTO that treats similar applications in dissimilar ways is
problematic for several reasons. To begin, the existence of interexaminer disparity itself demonstrates how much discretionary
authority PTO examiners wield and instills little confidence that they
are exercising this discretion to apply patentability standards in a
guided and regimented manner. In other words, inconsistent behavior
across examiners leaves observers wondering whether examiners are
systematically “missing the mark” in making validity determinations.
The patentability standards are set to generally parallel the economic
justifications for patents—that is, a patent should not be granted to an
invention that is not novel because such non-novel patents have the
potential to impose the costs of the patent system on society without
producing the commensurate innovative benefits. As a result, the
consequences of examiners routinely reaching erroneous patentability
determinations can be substantial.
Aside from the concerns that inconsistent examinations invoke
regarding the quality of the review process itself, inter-examiner
disparity may also erode confidence in the PTO by creating the
17
appearance of unfairness and arbitrariness. Such an appearance
could diminish the incentives for innovation, as would-be applicants
decide instead to pursue other endeavors. Of course, inconsistent
patentability decisions are also worrisome solely from an equity
standpoint.
Finally, it should be noted that, although concerns over interexaminer disparity and over the issuance of invalid patents are very
much related, they can also be analyzed as separate and distinct
concepts. After all, it is possible that the PTO could have highly
inconsistent decisions that generally converge around the proper
application of the patentability standards. It is also possible that the
Agency could have highly consistent decisions that reflect examiners’

16. See Cockburn et al., supra note 9, at 19 (finding that differences in examiners explain a
significant percentage of the variation in the characteristics of issued patents, and that some
examiners are more likely than others to have their patents upheld in court); Douglas Lichtman,
Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 155 (2004) (finding that
certain examiners more systematically required applicants to narrow the scope of their patents).
17. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 73 (1983); Abramowicz & Duffy,
supra note 9, at 1558 (noting that the PTO’s “challenge is to ensure that the judgments of [its
patent examiners] are relatively high quality and highly consistent”).
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biases toward granting or rejecting patents. As such, in our analysis
below, we attempt to address the implications of cohort dynamics
within the PTO with each of these distinct social concerns in mind.
The quality and consistency of the PTO’s judgments have
become such important and visible issues that Congress, the judiciary,
and the Agency itself have taken steps to diminish the issuance of
low-quality patents and bring uniformity to the Agency’s
decisionmaking. The Supreme Court has recently taken a renewed
interest in substantive patent law, wherein, among other things, it has
strengthened the doctrine of nonobviousness in an effort to make it
18
easier for the Agency to reject invalid patents. In 2011, Congress
enacted the first major patent-reform bill in over six decades. This
reform bill granted the agency new adjudicatory authorities and the
ability to set its own fees, changes that were meant to increase both
19
patent quality and consistency. Just last year, the PTO held the first
Patent Quality Summit, where it sought input on a set of proposals
for enhancing patent quality and consistency across examiner
20
determinations.
Of course, finding a solution to the problems of low-quality
issuances and inconsistent patentability determinations necessarily
requires correctly identifying the features of the patent system that
shape an examiner’s granting proclivities. Although commentators
have suggested many reasons that the Agency may be inclined to
21
grant invalid patents, there exists little compelling empirical
evidence showing what features of the system drive an examiner’s
22
decision to allow a patent (outside of the merits of the invention).
As a result, policymakers have been making changes to the patent

18. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007).
19. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–313
(2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19, 321–29) (providing for post-grant review
proceedings); id. § 10, 125 Stat. at 316–20 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41) (providing for
fee-setting authority); id. § 12, 125 Stat. at 325–27 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 257)
(providing for supplemental examination); id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. § 321) (providing for a transitional program for covered business-method patents);
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40 (noting that the primary purpose of the America Invents
Act is to “improve patent quality”).
20. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 5.
21. See Frakes & Wasserman, Bad Patents, supra note 6, at 619 (summarizing the various
reasons why the PTO may allow too many low-quality patents).
22. Id. at 621–25. But see Lemley & Sampat, supra note 15, at 817 (finding that experienced
examiners cite less prior art and are more likely to grant patents); sources cited supra note 6
(same).
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system absent empirical evidence to help illuminate the actual
problems at hand. This paper builds upon the prior efforts of the
Authors to rectify this deficiency by examining how one factor likely
influences a patent examiner’s decision to grant a patent: the year the
patent examiner was hired by the PTO, together with the culture of
23
the Agency and the nature of the training in place at such time.
II. THEORY OF COHORT EFFECTS
This Part provides the theory behind cohort effects and
delineates several testable hypotheses that will guide our empirical
analysis. Before doing so, however, it is helpful to provide a brief
exposition of the patent-examination process. In order to obtain a
patent, an individual must file an application with the PTO, an agency
within the Department of Commerce. Before the application enters
examination, it is routed to an art unit, a group of eight to fifteen
patent examiners who review applications in the same technological
24
field. Upon the patent application’s arrival, the Supervisory Patent
Examiner of that art unit randomly assigns the application to a
25
specific examiner. The assigned examiner then assesses the
patentability of the invention based on the criteria outlined in the
Patent Act. This process typically begins with the examiner
performing a prior-art search to determine whether the invention is
26
novel and represents more than a trivial advancement over the
27
existing knowledge within the field. The examiner must also
determine whether the invention comprises patentable subject
28
29
matter and is useful, as well as whether the patent application meets
30
the disclosure requirements. If the invention fails one of the specific
31
patentability requirements, the examiner must reject the application.
If the application meets the patentability requirements, the examiner
32
must issue the patent. Although the stages associated with the patent
examination procedure are relatively structured, it is well-recognized
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See sources cited supra note 6.
See Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6 (manuscript at 6).
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
Id. § 103.
Id.
Id. § 101.
Id. § 112.
See Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6 (manuscript at 7–8).
Id.
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that patent examiners are afforded substantial discretion on how they
33
approach and execute the process.
With this brief exposition on the review of patent applications,
this Part now turns to examining why the year in which an examiner is
hired by the PTO may have a lasting effect on an examiner’s granting
patterns. Section A provides support for the proposition that, because
new hires are rather susceptible to influence, what they learn during
this initial period has an enduring effect well beyond the employee’s
period of acclimation to the organization. Sections B and C turn to
exploring which formal and informal aspects of the PTO can help
shape how newly hired patent examiners review patent applications.
A. New-Hire Impressibility, External Stimuli, and Learning Stickiness
Workers in many professions exercise some degree of discretion
in executing the tasks required by their positions. Over time, they
develop certain skills and methods that determine how they operate
within the bounds of their discretion. The management literature has
long recognized that early moments of employment are especially
34
important in understanding how new hires are shaped. In general,
this literature delineates three features that are essential for the
cohort-effects phenomenon—that is, for the early-career period to
35
have a persistent influence on how work duties are executed. The
first unique feature of the cohort-effects argument is that new hires
are significantly more malleable than individuals who have worked in
36
an organization for a substantial duration of time. Newly hired

33. Cockburn et al., supra note 9, at 28 (noting that “substantial discretion is provided to
examiners in how they deal with applications”).
34. See, e.g., Natalie J. Allen & John P. Meyer, Organizational Socialization Tactics: A
Longitudinal Analysis of Links to Newcomers’ Commitment and Role Orientation, 33 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 847 (1990); Bruce Buchanan II, Building Organizational Commitment: The
Socialization of Managers in Work Organizations, 19 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 533 (1974).
35. Cohort effects can encompass more than the learning effect described in this Section.
Management scientists often utilize cohort effects to refer to a high degree of similarity in
outcomes within cohorts. See, e.g., Aparna Joshi, John C. Dencker, Gentz Franz & Joseph J.
Martocchio, Unpacking Generational Identities in Organizations, 35 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 392,
392–94 (2010). This intra-cohort homogeneity in outcomes could result from an imprinting
effect—the initial conditions of an organization imprint a new employee—as we describe in this
Section or because the organization hired individuals of similar traits in a given year (that is,
individuals with similar education, ideological backgrounds, etc.). In Part IV.D, we argue that
our results are more consistent with the former than the latter.
36. Gordon J. DiRenzo, Socialization, Personality, and Social Systems, 3 ANN. REV. SOC.
261 (1977); Herminia Ibarra, Provisional Selves: Experimenting with Image and Identity in
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employees are assumed to constitute more of a blank slate, in part,
37
because of uncertainty regarding the new role requirements. During
the initial period of employment, it is believed that “cognitive models
that . . . [individuals] hold can be challenged and replaced with scripts
38
and schema that are more congruent with the new environment.”
The second element of cohort effects is that externalenvironmental features exert a substantial influence on individuals
39
during their transition period with an organization. Given the
enhanced impressionability of employees during the early stage of
their careers, new employees are especially open to an organization’s
40
environmental stimuli. As a result, the conditions of an organization
during a new hire’s acclimation period are likely to have a strong
influence on how the new hire approaches and executes her job
41
functions.
The final element of the cohort-effects hypothesis is that this
molding of behavior which occurs during an individual’s transition
period with an organization persists long after she ceases to be a new
hire and even if significant changes take place in the environment of
an organization. Individuals tend to be less receptive to learning and
environmental influences outside of role transitions, such as joining a
42
new organization. Although individuals can still learn new skills
outside of role transitions, the rate at which they learn is lower than
when they are in a formative period. Thus, after the transitional
period ends, individuals “freeze” their behavior and patterns: they
43
stick with the skills and habits they have learned. As a result, an

Professional Adaptation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 764 (1999); John Van Maanen & Edgar H. Schein,
Toward a Theory of Organizational Socialization, 1 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 209 (1979).
37. Blake E. Ashforth & Alan M. Saks, Socialization Tactics: Longitudinal Effects on
Newcomer Adjustment, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 149, 149 (1996).
38. Gina Dokko, Steffanie L. Wilk & Nancy P. Rothbard, Unpacking Prior Experience:
How Career History Affects Job Performance, 20 ORG. SCI. 51, 55 (2009).
39. Edgar H. Schein, The Individual, the Organization, and the Career: A Conceptual
Scheme, 7 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 401, 422–23 (1971).
40. Id.
41. See Pierre Azoulay, Christopher C. Liu & Toby E. Stuart, Social Influence Given
(Partially) Deliberate Matching: Career Imprints in the Creation of Academic Entrepreneurs 4
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper 09-136, 2009); Aleksandra J. Kacperczyk, Inside or Outside:
The Social Mechanisms of Entrepreneurship Choices. Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry
33–35 (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan).
42. See DiRenzo, supra note 36, at 268; Ibarra, supra note 36, at 767; Van Maanen &
Schein, supra note 36, at 213.
43. Ashforth & Saks, supra note 37, at 171–72.
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individual’s approach to her job will tend to bear the stamp of the
environment she experienced during the early stage of her career.
There are a growing number of studies in a variety of
populations that have found empirical support for this cohorts
phenomenon. For instance, an analysis of managers, lawyers, and
scientists suggest that even when individuals move past the early
apprenticeship stage of their careers, they continue to carry with them
44
behaviors and beliefs adopted during the acclimation period. This
evidence has led scholars to conclude that employees from a variety
of disciplines such as academic advisors, accountants, coordinators,
research specialists, and technicians are highly impressionable during
these early stages. It has also led commentators to deduce that what
employees learn during this period of acclimation to the organization
can have a long-lasting effect on how they continue to operate within
45
the range of their discretion down the road.
44. MONICA C. HIGGINS, CAREER IMPRINTS: CREATING LEADERS ACROSS AN INDUSTRY
12–14 (1st ed. 2005); Bill McEvily, Jonathan Jaffee & Marco Tortoriello, Not All Bridging Ties
Are Equal: Network Imprinting and Firm Growth in the Nashville Legal Industry, 1933-1978, 23
ORG. SCI. 547, 559–60 (2012); Damon J. Phillips, Organizational Genealogies and the Persistence
of Gender Inequality: The Case of Silicon Valley Law Firms, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 440, 467–68
(2005); Azoulay et al., supra note 41.
45. Michael F. Gast & Paul J. Patinka, Imprinting the Young Employee, BUS. HORIZONS 11
(July–Aug. 1983); John Kammeyer-Mueller, Connie Wanberg, Alex Rubenstein & Zhaoli Song,
Support, Undermining and Newcomer Socialization: Fitting in During the First 90 Days, 56
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1104, 1111 (2013). The idea that employees are most impressionable during
the early stage of employment has been recognized in the workers-union context, see PAUL F.
CLARK, BUILDING MORE EFFECTIVE UNIONS 57 (2009) (“It is extremely important for the
union to make its case in these early stages of employment when the new employee is the most
impressionable.”), the financial-advisors context, see LAUREN FARASATI, STAFF TO LAST!: FOR
FINANCIAL ADVISORS ONLY: HOW TO BUILD A STAFF THAT MAKES YOUR CLIENTS HAPPY,
YOUR PEERS JEALOUS, AND YOUR WALLET FAT 88 (2009) (“And the bulk of training occurs
during the window in which new employees are both most impressionable and most vulnerable.
Having a training structure will produce confident employees who learned the important stuff
and the right skills from day one.”), as well as the medical-business context, see BOB PHIBBS,
THE RETAIL DOCTOR’S GUIDE TO GROWING YOUR BUSINESS 140 (2010) (“Employees are
most impressionable when they are first hired.”); see also ANDERS ORTENBLAD, HANDBOOK
OF RESEARCH ON THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION: ADAPTATION AND CONTEXT 122 (2013)
(noting that “[h]aving been deeply immersed in the protected business environment of SOEs in
China over a protected period of time, many employees, especially old timers, had developed
entrenched ‘social defenses’ against the learning and change . . . and were skeptical about the
benefits promised by the reforms”); PETER B. GRAZIER, TEAM BUILDERS PLUS, OVERCOMING
RESISTANCE TO EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT, http://teambuildersplus.com/articles/overcomingresistance-to-employee-involvement [http://perma.cc/UUW7-XZ9E] (“Because our prior
training and condition is such a significant barrier to our ability to change, we need to take some
very proactive steps.”).
A related literature examines how employees have difficulty adjusting to new contexts
and unlearning deeply embedded beliefs, practices, and knowledge. For instance, physicians
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As a result, we begin by hypothesizing that patent examiners are
particularly suggestible during their first year at the PTO and that the
initial conditions faced by examiners at that time—that is, the
allowance culture or the training practices—can have a persistent
effect on how the examiner approaches the review of patent
applications, including her general granting proclivities. In light of
such persistence in behaviors and possible variations that likely exist
in initial hiring conditions over time, we thus predict that examiners
of different hiring cohorts will adopt and then largely maintain certain
granting practices.
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, the year a patent examiner is
hired by the Agency will impact the grant rate that she follows
throughout the course of her tenure.
B. The PTO’s Allowance Culture
To the extent that new hires are particularly impressionable,
initial hiring conditions may help explain an examiner’s granting
proclivities over the course of her career. Certain conditions present
at the PTO may be of paramount significance in this regard. Perhaps
most saliently, the Agency’s allowance culture—or the emphasis that
the PTO places on allowing versus rejecting patents—at the time an
examiner was hired could have a long-lasting effect on her granting
behavior. Such an effect may even persist in the face of shifts in the
46
Agency’s allowance culture over the course of an examiner’s career.
Quantifying the PTO’s allowance disposition at any moment in
time is inherently difficult. To help determine this feature of the
Agency, we rely primarily upon qualitative assessments of the
stringency of the Agency’s quality-assurance program. Although we
recognize that other directives could serve as proxies for the Agency’s
allowance culture, we nevertheless focus on the variation in the
severity of the PTO’s quality-assurance mechanisms given that they
have been accused of being slow to embrace a new model of healthcare that considers costs in
their diagnostic and treatment recommendations or adjust their prescribing behavior of
prescription drugs in light of new evidence. See, e.g., Eve Glicksman, Teaching Doctors How to
Improve Care and Lower Costs . . . at the Same Time, AM. ASS’N MED. COLLEGES (June 2015),
https://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/june2015/434756/lower-costs.html
[http://perma.cc/
7AC5-YEKC] (“Instilling cost awareness in physicians and asking them to consider costs in
their diagnostic and treatment recommendations, however, is a challenge requiring a cultural
shift from deeply entrenched values and practices in medicine.”).
46. The management literature has long recognized that an organization’s culture can be a
strong influence in shaping the behaviors and beliefs of new hires. See, e.g., HIGGINS, supra note
44; Dokko et al., supra note 38, at 55.

FRAKES AND WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

PATENT OFFICE COHORTS

4/21/2016 3:36 PM

1615

are the natural and effective tools by which Agency heads can convey
47
their granting preferences. That is, the operation of the Agency’s
quality-assurance initiatives is largely in the discretion of the
Agency’s upper management, which would make them an attractive
policy lever to effectuate a change in management’s views toward
allowing or rejecting applications. If high-level management believes
that the PTO is allowing too many low-quality patents, then it may
choose to strengthen the Agency’s quality-assurance program by
sending a signal to examiners that the PTO now values rejecting
patents more than it did in the preceding years. Conversely, if highlevel officials at the Agency believe that the PTO is erroneously
rejecting too many valid patents, they may weaken the qualityassurance initiatives in order to correct for what they perceive to be
48
an overly restrictive granting culture. Moreover, because qualityassurance programs aimed at evaluating individual examiner behavior
(and aimed at assisting in promotion decisions) have such a strong
potential to redirect examiner practices, this particular policy tool has
the potential to powerfully implement the directives of management.
The rest of this Section utilizes variation in the nature of the
PTO’s quality-assurance program to help map out three distinct
regimes of the Agency’s “allowance culture” over the period ranging
from 1993 to 2012: (1) a more permissive granting culture throughout
the 1990s; (2) a less permissive granting culture in the mid- to late2000s; and (3) a more permissive granting culture in the 2010–2012
period. We emphasize that these regimes are relative to one another.
That is, we suggest only that the attitude of the Agency in the 1990s
was more permissive with respect to granting than it was in the midto late-2000s. We do not attempt to classify these cultural eras relative
to some normatively optimal benchmark.
47. Our interviews with patent examiners suggest that some believe a change in the
allowance culture is effectuated through a top-down approach wherein high-ranking officials
communicate a need for change in allowance culture to officials directly below them and
wherein these officials further communicate these instructions to those below them, etc.
Telephone Interview with Former Patent Exam’r No. 7, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (June
30, 2015); cf. Frakes & Wasserman, Bad Patents, supra note 6, at 665 (discussing possible
channels by which the PTO could favor certain patent types over others, including a top-down
approach).
48. The Agency could also change the culture of allowance in an effort to address its
growing backlog of patent applications. Because patent applicants can continuously refile
rejected applications, allowing patents is the easiest way for the PTO to diminish or at least slow
down the growth of its application backlog. See, e.g., Frakes & Wasserman, Bad Patents, supra
note 6, at 616 (describing why a resource-constrained agency may allow additional patents in an
effort to decrease its backlog).
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The 1990s arguably represented a high water mark with respect
to the Agency’s culture of allowance. At this time, the Agency not
only infamously stated that its “primary mission” was “to help
customers get patents,” but it also severely compromised much of its
49
quality-assurance infrastructure. Generally speaking, the PTO’s
quality-assurance efforts are implemented through two different
mechanisms: quality-assurance reviews performed by the Office of
Patent Quality Review and integrated quality reviews within each of
the PTO’s nine technology centers (that is, large collections of
examiners that review applications in the same general technological
50
field). Since its inception in 1974, the Office of Patent Quality
Review has randomly selected a sample of allowed applications and
has conducted its own independent review of the applications to
determine if the examiner properly decided the invention merited a
51
patent. Decisions by high-ranking officials in the PTO, however, left
the Office of Patent Quality Review largely ineffective for a
substantial period of time in the 1990s.
In 1990, the Inspector General relied on data from the Office of
Patent Quality Review to fault the PTO for failing to reduce error
52
rates. The Agency’s management responded by proposing to
eliminate the Office of Patent Quality Review (and its evaluations) in
favor of utilizing customers’ (that is, patentees’) satisfaction surveys
53
as the PTO’s primary measure of examination quality. In 1993, the
PTO began reducing the staff of the Office of Patent Quality Review
to prepare for replacing the office with the “reengineered quality
54
process.” By 1996 the PTO slashed the Office of Patent Quality
Review in half, resulting in the office sampling only 2 percent of
allowed applications, well below the 4 percent sampling rate the

49. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CORPORATE PLAN—2001: PATENT BUSINESS 23
(2001), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/corpplan/pt04.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SCX-VS69].
50. Historically, the integrated quality review was mainly comprised of supervisors
reviewing the work of examiners, especially the work of junior examiners. In response to the
1997 Inspector General Report, the PTO expanded integrated quality review to include some
in-process review—i.e., quality review before an application was allowed. In 2000, the integrated
quality review was further expanded for a small subset of applications directed toward business
methods, in which all allowances were subjected to a mandatory second round of review.
51. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT NO. OIG-11-006-I,
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE PATENT QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESS 2 (2011).
52. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT NO. PTD-9977-70001, PATENT QUALITY CONTROLS ARE INADEQUATE 1–3 (1997).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 4.
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Agency had determined was necessary to provide valid results. After
the Inspector General criticized the Agency’s quality-assurance
program in 1997, the PTO agreed to increase the Office of Patent
Quality Review’s staff in order to provide statistically valid samples of
56
allowed applications. Accordingly, both the compromised qualityassurance program and the Agency’s own mission statement suggest
that the PTO had a rather permissive allowance culture during the
1990s.
The PTO’s allowance culture arguably became less permissive in
2002. At this time, the Agency proposed a series of enhanced-quality
initiatives that both improved quality review at the Office of Patent
Quality Review and integrated quality review within a technology
57
center. These initiatives, which represented the most significant
restructuring of the PTO’s quality-assurance program in over twentyfive years, were largely implemented in the end of 2003 and
58
throughout 2004 under Jon Dudas, then Director of the PTO. These
quality-assurance initiatives included, among other things, an
expansion of the Agency’s mandatory second-review program and the
implementation of a certification program that required examiners to
59
demonstrate examination proficiency periodically. Importantly, the
Agency committed significant human resources to implement these
initiatives, creating a series of new positions and more than doubling
the number of individuals whose primary responsibility was to review

55. Id. The revamped survey-based evaluation process suffered delays and setbacks and
never made it out of the pilot stage. Id. at 5–6.
56. Id. at 6–7. At this time the Agency also adopted the Inspector General’s suggestion to
review first office actions—the first substantive evaluation of an application—rather than only
allowed applications. ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF COMMERCE & COMM. OF PATENTS &
TRADEMARKS, DRAFT RESPONSE TO DRAFT AUDIT REPORT NO. PTD-9977-7-XXXX:
“PATENT QUALITY CONTROLS ARE INADEQUATE” 1, 3 (1997).
57. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 2003, at 12 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 PERFORMANCE REPORT].
58. THOMAS H. STANTON ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE: TRANSFORMING TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 65
(2005). These new quality initiatives, among other things, represented a shift in focus from the
end-of-examination review to in-process examination review, as well as a push to use qualityassurance results to improve individual examiner performance and improve training programs.
2003 PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 57, at 2–3; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2004, at 3 (2004) [hereinafter 2004
PERFORMANCE REPORT].
59. The Agency first introduced this second review program in 2000 but only for allowed
patents in class 705 of business methods. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST
CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 9 (2003); 2004 PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 58.
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60

the work of examiners. After the implementation of these new
61
directives, the Agency’s grant rate dropped dramatically. Robert
Budens, the president of the patent examiner union, remarked that
these initiatives created an environment where examiners “started
becoming fearful of allowing [applications] because you could run
62
headlong into quality review problems that make life miserable.”
Thus, it appears that the PTO’s allowance culture had waned in the
mid- to late-2000s, at least in comparison to the 1990s.
The appointment of David Kappos as Director of the PTO in
August 2009 arguably represents another shift in the Agency’s views
63
toward allowing patents. Almost immediately upon starting as
Director, Kappos addressed “the culture of rejection” that pervaded
the office under Dudas by sending an email to all examiners stating,

60. STANTON ET AL., supra note 58, at 67 (noting that the agency created a director for the
Office of Patent Quality and Assurance, review-quality specialists who conduct quality reviews
and report to the Office of Patent Quality and Assurance, and twenty-two training qualityassurance specialists resident in the Technology Center who conduct in-process quality reviews
and report directly to the Technology Center Directors). In the late 1990s, full staffing of the
Office of Patent Quality Review required sixteen reviewers. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra
note 52, at 4.
The result was four different types of quality review: the Office of Patent Quality Review
continued to review examiner work of applications that were allowed while newly created
training quality-assurance specialists conducted both second-pair-eyes-review for allowed
applications in specific fields and random in-process reviews of examiners’ work after first office
actions were completed, and focused on in-process reviews in response to supervisors’ requests.
STANTON ET AL., supra note 58, at 67.
61. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office)
(highlighting that the Agency grant rate in 2007 was only 44 percent, nearly 30 percent lower
than the allowance rate in the late 1990s); Terry Carter, A Patent on Problems, ABA J. (Mar. 10,
2010, 11:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_patent_on_problems [http://
perma.cc/3UQF-U8ZE] (noting that Jon Dudas, who was Director of the PTO from 2004 to
2008, stated, “We focused on quality with a number of new initiatives and the error rate came
down . . . . We anticipated the allowance rate to come down, but didn’t think it would come
down as much as it did”); see infra Table 1.
62. Carter, supra note 61 (noting that Robert Budens, president of the patent examiner
union, stated “[t]he levels of review got ridiculous . . . . The allowance rate began to drop like a
stone, in part from a larger fear created in the examining corps, and especially the supervisors
who don’t want to get dinged on their performance”); Telephone Interview with Former Patent
Exam’r No. 7, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (June 30, 2015) (noting that the Agency had a
culture of rejection in the mid-2000s).
63. This is not to say there have not been changes to the incentive structure of examiners in
efforts to increase patent quality. For instance, in 2010 the PTO changed the production
schedule of examiners as well as the metrics utilized to review supervisors. See U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010, at 16–17 (2010).
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“Let’s be clear: Patent quality does not equal rejection.” During the
end of 2009 and beginning of 2010, the PTO began to rectify what
Kappos believed was examiners’ reluctance to allow patents by
rolling back potentially ineffective quality-assurance initiatives—that
is, abolishing the mandatory second-review program and reducing the
65
certification program for examiners. In addition, in 2010 the Agency
implemented initiatives to increase the effectiveness of patent
prosecution, which it touted as increasing the PTO’s allowance rate
66
while also increasing the quality of review. Thus, it appears that from
2010–2012 the PTO’s allowance culture became more permissive.
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, patent examiners hired during
a time period when the Agency had a more permissive allowance
culture will have a higher grant rate throughout their careers than
patent examiners hired during a time period when the Agency had a
less permissive allowance culture.
C. The PTO’s New-Hire Training Programs
The preceding subsection predicts that the Agency’s allowance
culture at the time an examiner was hired may have a lasting
influence on how an examiner approaches the review of patent
applications, including her granting proclivities. This Section posits
that changes in the rigor and length of new-hire training programs at
the PTO can amplify or attenuate the extent to which new cohorts of
examiners adhere to the prevailing allowance culture of the Agency.
Assuming that the PTO will promote its allowance philosophy—be it
permissive or restrictive in nature—in its new-hire training programs,
this Section posits that the longer a new patent examiner receives
formal new-hire training, the more likely she is to become
indoctrinated into the Agency’s prevailing allowance culture (at least
that component of the Agency’s culture being propagated by central
Agency heads).

64. Carter, supra note 61.
65. Telephone Interview with Steven Griffin, Senior Adviser for the Office of Comm’r for
Patents (July 6, 2015).
66. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 2009, at 14 (2009). Kappos also successfully reengineered the way examiners earn
credits toward their production quotas by giving examiners more time to review patent
applications. Id. at 3, 18. The PTO explained that this and other changes were meant to
“[r]educe examiner reluctance to allow applications.” U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
JOINT LABOR & MGMT. COUNT SYS. TASK FORCE, OVERVIEW OF COUNT SYSTEM INITIATIVES
AND CHANGES 3, 16 (Mar. 8, 2010) (on file with author).
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The Section now turns to describing the two distinct new-hire
training regimes of the PTO over the period of 1993 to 2012: (1) a
very minimal formal training period before 2006 and (2) a robust
formal training period during and after 2006. The PTO, like other
organizations, requires its examiners to complete a series of training
programs before they can begin routine evaluation of patent
applications. Before 2006, the formal training of new patent
examiners was rather modest. Newly hired patent examiners received
only two to three weeks of formal, centralized training before they
67
were assigned to an art unit. Upon assignment to an art unit, new
hires immediately began to review actual patent applications, during
which time the supervisor of the art unit provided additional informal
68
training.
In 2006, the PTO dramatically changed how the Agency trained
new patent examiners with the opening of the Patent Training
69
Academy. The Patent Training Academy provided new patent

67. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1102, U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE: HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT
APPLICATION BACKLOG 10 (2007). Examiners’ two weeks of formal training included an
introduction to the software utilized by examiners and a brief primer on patents. ANNEMARIE
L. M. FIELD, CONNOR MCGRATH & ELAINA NICHOLS, PATENT EXAMINER RECRUITMENT,
PROJECT NUMBER: 45-HXA-0707, at 71 (Dec. 12, 2007), https://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/
Available/E-project-121207-102952/unrestricted/USPTOFINALREPORT.pdf [http://perma.cc/
YH4Q-2DBU].
68. FIELD ET AL., supra note 67, at 71. New examiners, like other examiners, also
periodically received additional formal training. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2002, at 101–03 (2002).
Once new hires begin actually reviewing patent applications they are technically subject
to production quotas like the other examiners in the examining corps are. However, production
quotas are not generally enforced against new hires for the first year. Nevertheless, new hires
are expected to demonstrate an increase in production with the general goal of meeting full
production at approximately the one-year mark. Patent examiners also appeared to be hired
under a probationary period for much of our sample period. This probationary period was two
years for much of the early 2000s and one year in the late 2000s. Although production quotas
are not technically utilized to determine the performance review of an examiner during her first
year, they are used to determine who would be retained at the PTO. For instance, an examiner
who was meeting only 50 percent of her production quota by near the end of her first year in
terms of reviewing applications could be in jeopardy of being fired. Telephone Interview with
Former Patent Exam’r No. 7, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (June 30, 2015); Telephone
Interview with Current Patent Exam’r No. 6, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (July 2, 2015).
69. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 2006, at 4 (2006). This transformation in training practices coincided with an expansion
in the Agency, including hiring approximately 2,000 new examiners over a two-year period
which increased the number of patent examiners by 50 percent, during which the Agency
realized it was no longer feasible to saddle the majority of new-hire training on senior
examiners. Id.; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2007–2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 6–7,

FRAKES AND WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

PATENT OFFICE COHORTS

4/21/2016 3:36 PM

1621

examiners with an eight-month, university-style formal training
program and brought more uniformity and rigor to the training
70
process. For the first two months, new hires attended large lectures
that mimicked college courses in which they received training on laws
and procedures associated with the examination of patent
71
applications, and soft skills such as interpersonal and work-life skills.
After this initial two-month period, new hires began to work on
actual patent applications from their home art units, in addition to
72
attending lectures. At the end of the eight-month period, examiners
transitioned fully into their home art units, where they subsequently
received informal training from their supervisors.
In 2006, however, not all new hires were subject to the
redesigned training program. Approximately half of the 1,218 new
patent examiners hired in 2006 received training through the new
Patent Training Academy for up to eight consecutive months while
the other half received training under the prior model—that is, two
weeks of formal training before being assigned to their home art
73
units. Selection for the more rigorous new-hire training depended
upon the examiner’s technological specialty. That is, examiners who
were hired based upon their backgrounds to review applications in
certain fields, such as computer hardware and software,
overwhelmingly received the more extensive new-hire training,
whereas examiners who were hired to review other technologies, such
74
as agriculture, food, and textiles, did not. Beginning in 2007, all new
75
hires were subject to the enhanced new training program.

http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007-2012.pdf [http://
perma.cc/3FAF-8999].
70. Examiners that enter the Patent Training Academy are divided into subgroups
comprising approximately sixteen examiners with similar scientific backgrounds to whom a
primary trainer and an assistant trainer are assigned. FIELD ET AL., supra note 67, at 71.
71. Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://careers.uspto.
gov/Pages/PEPositions?Training.aspx [http://perma.cc/65QG-7D2Y].
72. FIELD ET AL., supra note 67, at 71.
73. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 2006, at 16–17 (2006).
74. The Appendix provides more details as to which technology areas examiners received
the eight-month formal style training in 2006.
75. In 2010, the Agency made another change in its new training process. At this time, the
Agency replaced the eight-month training program with two new initiatives. The first was a
twenty-day training program for new examiners with at least one year of prior intellectual
property experience. The second was a two-phased twelve-month program for new examiners
without prior intellectual property experience. The two-phase twelve-month program differed
from the previous eight-month training process in several respects. Most saliently, it decreased
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Hypothesis 3: The longer the amount of time new patent
examiners receive formal training, the more likely their grant rates will
reflect the allowance culture of the PTO at the time they were hired.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data
In order to establish the link between the granting styles of
patent examiners and the hiring cohorts to which they belong, it is
necessary to amass rich data on patent applications spanning enough
time to be able to distinguish true cohort effects from other related
but distinct determinants of granting practices—for example, the
effect of gaining additional years of experience. To date, data rich
enough to accomplish this task has generally been unavailable. In
fact, most prior investigations into the determinants of examiner
76
behavior have explored only issued patents. A sampling frame of
this nature is incapable of capturing the key decision that an examiner
must make: whether or not to grant the given patent application.
Furthermore, when prior studies have actually used application-level
data, they have done so only with respect to a subset of applications
77
filed at one point in time, a metric which does not help to isolate
true cohort effects of the sort envisioned by this Article.
To overcome these deficiencies, we collected data on the nearly 2
78
million utility-patent applications filed on or after March 2001 that
were published by July 2012 from the PTO’s Patent Application
79
Information Retrieval (PAIR) database. By the end of 2012, 49

the time new examiners spend receiving formal training in the Patent Training Academy by half
before examiners transitioned into their home art units. Examiners did, however, continue to
periodically receive formal training at the Patent Training Academy for the first eight months
after transitioning into their home art units. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra
note 63, at 119–21.
76. See, e.g., Cockburn et al., supra note 9, at 19, 21; Lichtman, supra note 16, at 158;
Ronald J. Mann, The Idiosyncrasy of Patent Examiners: Effects of Experience and Attrition, 92
TEX. L. REV. 2149, 2158 (2014).
77. For instance, one of the few papers that does utilize application-level data considers
only 10,000 applications filed in January 2001. Lemley & Sampat, supra note 15, at 817.
78. Utility patents protect the way an article is used and works. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
79. In November 2000, there was a change in the law that required newly filed patent
applications to be published eighteen months after they were filed. See id. § 122(b).
Applications abandoned within the first eighteen months of filing, id. § 122(b)(2)(A)(i), and
applications wherein the applicant filed a special exemption to maintain confidentiality, are
exempted from this requirement, id. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i):
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percent of these applications had resulted in patents, 25 percent were
80
not patented because they had been abandoned by the applicant,
and the remainder were still pending. Our study focuses on the 1.4
million utility-patent applications filed from 2001 onward that
received a final disposition—those that were granted or abandoned—
by July 2012.
Though publicly available, the PAIR database is not readily
suitable for a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of patent
examiner granting practices considering that the data is divided into
separate webpages for each individual application, with each webpage
providing information via numerous tab delimited and portable
document format (pdf) files. With help from the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois, we
amassed and coordinated the information provided by the more than
one million distinct webpages. Importantly, these data include
information on the outcome of the application process—that is,
whether or not the application was granted—along with the identity
of the patent examiner charged with reviewing the application. This
latter data field allowed us to merge application outcomes with
various characteristics of the examiner, including (1) the year in
which the examiner was hired by the PTO (and if the examiner was
hired in 2006, whether she received the eight-month or two-week
formal new hiring training), (2) the experience (in years) of the
examiner at the time of review of the application in question, and (3)
the general schedule (GS) pay-grade level of the examiner at the
moment of review. We collected information on these personnelrelated measures by filing various FOIA requests with the PTO.
Though our application-level data only starts in 2001, we collected
examiner roster information dating back to 1992, allowing us to

Such applications are . . . absent from the PAIR database. When some or all of an
applicant’s claims are not allowed by the Patent Office, the aggrieved party will
sometimes file a continuation application. This application is given a new serial
number and may be assigned to a different examiner. Continuation applications are
treated as unique applications in the PAIR database. A related and now far more
commonly used device, known as a Request for a Continued Examination (RCE),
does not receive a new application serial number and effectively allows an aggrieved
applicant to keep the application on the examiner’s docket for further prosecution.
RCEs are not treated as new, unique filings in the PAIR database; rather, they are
treated as a continuation in the prosecution of original applications.
Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6 (manuscript at 3–4 n.3).
80. Applicants may abandon their applications for a number of reasons including the
failure to overcome an examiner’s rejection, change in their research direction, and bankruptcy.
Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6 (manuscript at 4).
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nonetheless identify the distinct granting styles of those examiner
81
cohorts starting in the 1990s. Finally, we treat the individual who did
the majority of work on the application as the examiner charged with
reviewing that application: (1) the non-signatory examiner, when both
a non-signatory and an examiner with signatory authority are
associated with an application, or (2) the signatory examiner, when
82
only one examiner is associated with an application.
B. Summary Statistics
In Table 1, we summarize the mean grant rate for each PTO
cohort from 1992 to 2012, using the 2002–2012 PAIR data. As
demonstrated, the mean granting rates of the hiring cohorts from the
1990s are substantially higher than the hiring cohorts from the mid2000s, with a high of nearly 84 percent and a low of roughly 45
percent for the 2010 cohort. Across most of the intervening cohorts,
this decline in inherent granting tendencies appears gradual; however,
the data evidence large drops in grant rates between the 2003 and
2004 cohorts (registering an 8 percentage-point drop) and between
the 2006 and 2007 cohorts (registering a 7 percentage-point drop).
The mean grant rates then jump for the cohorts hired in 2011 and
2012. To be clear, the grant-rate trend evidenced in Table 1 does not
depict the mean grant rate of all of the observations disposed of in
1993, 1994 and so forth. Rather, the rate indicated for 1993 represents
the average grant rate applied by those examiners hired in 1993 over
the full 10 years of applications disposed of in our 2002–2012 PAIR
sample.
These summary statistics suggest that for applications processed
during the mid-2000s, the likelihood of success was far greater for
applications assigned to examiners that started in the 1990s than for
applications assigned to examiners who started in the mid-2000s. This
observation, however, does not necessarily evidence a true cohort
effect. That is, it does not provide compelling empirical support for
the proposition that examiners develop practice styles during the first
81. We drop applications reviewed by those examiners who have been with the PTO since
1992 and before to ensure that we can properly track all examiners’ experience lengths and
starting dates; however, the analysis is not affected to the extent we simply view the pre-1993
cohorts as one group (results available from the authors upon request).
82. Signatory authority is the authority, granted by the PTO, for examiners to represent the
Agency and to sign their own work. Examiners work toward obtaining such authority once they
have reached the rank of general pay schedule 13. Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra
note 6 (manuscript at 4–5).
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year at the PTO that generally persist over the course of their careers
at the Agency. After all, factors other than actual cohort dynamics
may account for this observed pattern. For instance, it could be that
individual examiners do not exhibit any stickiness in behavior but that
overall grant rates are falling substantially over time. As the
applications reviewed by more recent cohorts would only fall on the
tail end of this overall decline in grant rates, it would not be surprising
that these recent cohorts carry lower mean grant rates. As such, it is
first necessary to estimate the relationship between grant rates and
hiring cohorts while controlling flexibly for trends in overall grant
rates over time. This is a task that is made possible by the fact that the
sample of applications collected follows a number of overlapping
cohorts over a reasonably long period of time (in other words, given
that we observe multiple cohorts for any given examination year and
multiple years of examination for any given cohort, it is possible to
statistically disentangle the two).
Of equally important concern is the need to distinguish cohort
effects from experience effects, two related but distinct concepts.
Both concepts capture mechanisms by which learning may shape
granting practices; however, cohort effects focus on the early stages of
learning and training, particularly on how initial hiring conditions
may set a hiring cohort on a particular pathway. Some cohorts may
start off on very permissive trajectories, whereas others start off on
very restrictive trajectories. Once on their particular pathways,
however, examiners may nonetheless undergo further longer-term
developments as they spend more time with the Agency. For instance,
examiners of all cohorts—whether those on high-grant-rate or lowgrant-rate pathways—may experience a common evolutionary
process in which they all learn how to form more effective bases of
rejections over time. We characterize these latter developments as
“experience” effects. To be sure, the relationship between grant rates
of patent applications and experience effects is important in its own
83
right and, in fact, has been the subject of recent scholarship. In the
present study, we aim to build on these prior efforts and focus
attention on the importance of initial conditions and the
entrenchment in practice styles that they carry, a phenomenon that

83. See id. (manuscript at 18–25) (finding that experience does not induce examiners to
grant patents at a higher rate but that instead examiner’s grade level has explanatory power as
to her grant rate); Lemley & Sampat, supra note 15, at 817 (finding that more experienced
examiners have a higher grant rate than less experienced examiners).
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carries with it a range of critical policy implications distinct from
those pertaining to longer-term experience dynamics.
Fortunately, having collected data that allows us to follow many
cohorts over a long period of time, our analysis will likewise facilitate
the simultaneous estimation of cohort and experience effects in
explaining granting behaviors. For instance, though examiners from
the late 2000 cohorts only have limited experience, we may look to
the grant rates of the earlier cohorts during years when they likewise
had similarly low levels of experience in order to help us derive
common experience patterns while leaving some information by
which to identify the separate tendencies of the cohorts themselves.
Finally, we note that there may be other characteristics of the
applications under investigation or other changes in hiring practices
that may explain the simple summary statistics presented in Table 1.
For instance, one might be concerned that more of the new hires in
the mid-2000s were concentrated in certain technologies that are
generally associated with lower grant rates, as compared to those
hires from previous years. Accordingly, the empirical analysis below
will attempt to disentangle cohort effects from technology effects and
other application characteristics beyond experience and examinationyear effects.
C. Methodology
In the Appendix, we set forth in greater detail the precise
empirical specification that we estimate in order to both test for the
existence of cohort effects and to determine the nature and shape of
such effects. In short, we consider the sample of individual
applications from the PAIR database that were disposed of by July
84
2012 and regress the incidence of the relevant application being

84. Though we begin collecting applications that were filed as of March 2001, our goal is to
understand the determinants of the application being allowed or not. Few applications filed in
2001 will reach a final disposition in that year. As such, we simply ignore any final dispositions
we do observe in 2001 and focus our analysis on the applications disposed of between 2002 and
2012. In the Appendix, we present robustness checks to account for some degree of sample
imbalance that may arise through the timing of this analysis—e.g., by the fact that those
applications that will be disposed of in the early years of this sample are those that reach a final
disposition relatively quickly, whereas those disposed of in later years will represent a mix of
applications of varying prosecution lengths. To achieve better balance, the robustness exercise
conducted in the Appendix simply performs the analysis set forth below on a set of applications
that all reach a final disposition within three years while only looking at dispositions between
2004 and 2012, thereby ensuring that all applications in any given year of the sample are similar
in terms of length of prosecution.
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granted on a series of dummy variables indicating (1) the year in
which the examiner associated with the application began working
with the PTO—that is, cohort effects, (2) the year in which the
application was disposed of—that is, year effects, (3) the number of
years of experience of the associated examiner at the time of
examination of the relevant application (specified in accordance with
the experience-year groupings set forth in the Appendix to address
the well-known econometric issues with simultaneously estimating
year effects, cohort effects, and age/experience effects), (4) the GSlevel of the examiner, which we have previously shown is an
important determinant of the grant rate of the examiner insofar as it
85
bears on the amount of examination time at the examiner’s disposal,
86
(5) the technology category associated with the application, and (6)
the maximum number of years the relevant examiner spends at the
PTO—that is, the examiner’s “tenure”—which is of potential
relevance to the extent that those who depart the office quickly are of
inherently different dispositions relative to those who stay with the
87
PTO for a long time.
85. Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6 (manuscript at 9–10).
86. For these purposes, we use the thirty-seven technology sub-categories set forth by
Bronwyn Hall and colleagues, see The NBER Patent-Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights, and
Methodological Tools, in PATENTS, CITATIONS, AND INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 403, 452–54 tbl.9 (Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg eds., 2002). In
the Appendix, we demonstrate the robustness of the findings to the alternative use of PTO
Class groupings (which are more fine-grained). The inclusion of technology-category fixed
effects forces us to test for the presence of cohort effects by looking at dynamics within given
technologies. As such, this set of controls alleviates concerns that the estimated patterns of
cohort effects can be explained by trends in the technological emphasis of hiring over time. In
the Appendix, we take matters one step further and include technology-category-by-year fixed
effects. This richer set of controls can account for concerns that the PTO may differentially hire
in different fields over time and that each technology has its own idiosyncratic time trend in
grant rates. For example, it could be that the Agency hires more within a particular technology
in the mid-2000s—a technology that is generally associated with a low grant rate—but that this
particular technology also has an especially low grant rate—relative to its mean—in the mid2000s for some reason unrelated to the learning and training dynamics of interest in this Article.
Technology-by-year fixed effects allow for flexible trends in granting patterns over time within
each technology, thereby alleviating any such concerns. As we are still observing multiple,
overlapping cohorts of examiners over a long period of time within each separate technology,
we can still impose technology-by-year fixed effects while retaining the ability to tease out the
independent and general influence of the hiring year.
87. In robustness checks, we also control for certain additional characteristics of the
underlying application, including (1) an indicator variable for whether the applicant is a large or
small entity (as such terms are used to set application fees by the PTO), (2) the duration of the
prosecution period, (3) an indicator variable for whether the application was previously filed at
the EPO or JPO; and (4) an indicator variable for whether or not the applicant filed a request
for continued examination during the prosecution of the application.
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If cohort effects are not a real phenomenon—that is, if the
pattern of declining mean grant rates by hiring cohort from Table 1
can be explained by these other factors (for example, year,
experience, tenure, or GS-level effects)—we would expect to observe
few differences among the estimated coefficients of the cohort-year
dummies. In other words, if one plotted the estimated cohort
coefficients, they would stay roughly flat over time. For example, the
effect of the examiner being in the 1993 cohort, all else being equal,
would be roughly the same as the effect of the examiner being in the
1994 cohort, the 1995 cohort, and so on and so forth. In Part IV, we
will present results of this regression analysis and formally test for the
presence of differences in granting tendencies across cohorts.
Finally, the theory set forth in Part II also predicts that the
nature of such effects (to the extent they exist) will be a function of
certain conditions of the Agency at the time of hiring for the relevant
cohort—for example, the culture of the Agency and the nature of
examiner training. Accordingly, after having established that cohort
effects exist as a general phenomenon, our final methodological step
will test (via simple graphical observation) whether the pattern of
cohort effects that we estimate via our regression analysis aligns with
our priors regarding the evolution of training practices and granting
culture.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: Mean Grant Rates by Hiring Cohort
Year, Based on Applications Disposed of Between 2002 and 2012
Cohort

(1)
Mean (Standard Deviation)

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

83.7 (36.9)
77.2 (42.0)
76.3 (42.5)
78.3 (41.2)
78.6 (41.0)
78.5 (41.1)
75.1 (43.3)
74.4 (43.7)
72.9 (44.4)
71.3 (45.2)
67.0 (47.0)
58.6 (49.3)
58.5 (49.3)
55.4 (49.7)
48.4 (50.0)
45.9 (49.8)
47.1 (49.9)
45.4 (49.8)
56.8 (49.5)
52.6 (49.9)

IV. RESULTS
This Part turns to testing the key hypotheses presented in Part II
above. Generally, these hypotheses set forth that initial hiring
conditions at the PTO impact the granting behavior of an examiner
over the tenure of her career.
A. Primary Results
In Part II, we set forth the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, the year a patent examiner is
hired by the Agency will impact the grant rate that she follows
throughout the course of her tenure.
In Figure 1, we present estimates of the coefficients of the
cohort-year dummies from the regression described in Part III (the
tabular regression results underlying this Figure are presented in the
Appendix). These coefficients can effectively be interpreted as the
trend in inherent grant rates across different cohorts of examiners
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based on the year in which they are hired, where each point should be
interpreted with reference to the 1993 cohort, whose grant rate is
normalized at 0. For instance, the mean grant rate for the 2007 cohort
is roughly 11 percentage points lower (or roughly 16 percent lower in
light of an overall grant rate of 68 percent) than the mean grant rate
of the 1993 cohort. Although the regression underlying these
estimates includes controls for year effects, experience effects, GSlevel effects, tenure effects, and technology effects, we present only
the coefficients of the cohort-dummy variables in Figure 1, which
represent the measures of interest in this Article.
Figure 1: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring-Year Cohort
of Associated Patent Examiner, Among Applications Disposed of
Between 2002 and 2012, Controlling for Year Effects and Other
Application and Examiner Characteristics

Note: This figure presents results from a regression of a dummy variable indicating a
granted application on dummy variables representing the hiring year of the associated patent
examiner. The dummy variable for the 1993 cohort is omitted, representing the reference group.
The figure plots the estimated mean coefficients of the cohort effects only. Regressions include
year fixed effects, examiner-experience effects, GS-level effects, examiner tenure effects, and
technology effects.

As above, if cohort dynamics were not an actual determinant of
observed granting practices, one would predict a flat relationship
across the various coefficients of cohort indicators. Figure 1 hardly
fits this description, instead evidencing a strongly declining grant rate
as we head into the cohorts of examiners hired in the mid-2000s and a
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subsequent increase in granting tendencies as we view the cohorts at
the very end of the sample. With an F-statistic of 9.54 on the
estimated cohort effects, we can reject at beyond a 1 percent level of
statistical significance the hypothesis that the estimated cohort effects
are all jointly equal to 0—that is, that the grant rates do not differ
across cohorts. Accordingly, we can conclude that the pattern
estimated in Figure 1 is not merely a product of random noise, but
instead evidences a true pattern of cohort dynamics. Moreover, the
cohort effects we find are substantial. As noted above, examiners in
the 1993 hiring cohort have a mean grant rate roughly 11 percentage
points (or 16 percent) higher than those examiners starting in the late
2000s. Thus, our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1 in
suggesting that the year that an examiner was hired will impact her
grant rate throughout the course of her career.
B. Explaining Direction of Cohort Effects
In Part II, we set forth the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, patent examiners hired during
a time period when the Agency had a more permissive allowance
culture will have a higher grant rate throughout their careers than
patent examiners hired during a time period when the Agency had a
less permissive allowance culture.
As discussed in Part II, the PTO generally had three distinct
allowance cultures over the period of our study: (1) a more permissive
allowance culture throughout the 1990s, (2) a less permissive granting
culture throughout the mid- to late-2000s, and (3) a more permissive
granting culture during the period of 2010–2012. These cultural shifts
are reflected in overall year-by-year grant rates of the Agency,
controlling for the variety of variables set forth in Part III. In Figure
2, we present estimates of the coefficients of the year fixed effects that
are included in the regression underlying Figure 1. Figure 2
demonstrates that the grant rate of the entire examiner corps was
trending downwards throughout the mid- to late-2000s, aligning with
88
the less permissive granting culture throughout that time period, and
88. In our previous research, we stressed that the financial strain placed on the Agency
over this decade may have incentivized it to grant patents at higher rates in order to generate
additional fee revenue and/or to discourage the filing of costly continuation applications. See
generally Frakes & Wasserman, Agency Funding, supra note 6; Frakes & Wasserman, Bad
Patents, supra note 6. How can these previous arguments be reconciled with the present
predictions of a decreasing grant-rate philosophy of the Agency over this time? As emphasized
in our prior work, the grant rate may change from year to year due to stories unrelated to the
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that the grant rate of the entire examiner corps reversed and trended
upward in 2010, aligning with a more permissive granting culture in
the 2010s.
Figure 2. Relationship Between Grant Rates and Year of Disposition of
Application, Among Applications Disposed of Between 2002 and 2012,
Controlling for Cohort Effects and Other Application and Examiner
Characteristics

Note: This figure presents the mean estimates of the coefficients of the year fixed effects
that are included in the regression underlying Figure 1.

fee- and continuation-related mechanisms of interest in that prior research. Although we did not
specify as such during these prior articles, one unrelated story of this nature could be the desire
of the Agency to improve the quality of its examination practices and to retreat from the
customer-focused mentality of the previous decade. What this prior research effectively did then
was to predict that financial considerations may have caused the Agency to hold back on
pushing grant rates as low as it otherwise may have wanted absent such financial woes.
Moreover, we predicted (and found evidence consistent with such predictions) that the Agency
may have targeted this fee- or continuation-related granting bias on those types of applications
that would deliver the Agency the largest payoff. As such, taking all of our research together,
one can say that the Agency in the mid-2000s sought to generally depress the elevated grant
rates it had been administering previously, but perhaps not as much in the case of those
application types with respect to which elevated grant rates garner certain financial benefits for
the Agency.
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This Article’s primary focus, however, is not whether the
Agency’s allowance culture affects the grant rate of the entire
examiner corps—that is, year effects—but rather whether the PTO’s
granting culture has a lasting effect on the allowance rate of
examiners hired at that time—that is, cohort effects. In other words,
we are interested in the degree to which temporal changes in the
Agency’s culture and the Director’s communications have a longlasting impact on new hires’ granting proclivities. As suggested in Part
III, we might predict that the estimated cohort effects fell when the
Agency’s granting rhetoric took a restrictive turn in 2003/2004 with
the roll out of a new patent-quality initiative. Consistent with the
preliminary summary statistics set forth in Table 1 and discussed in
Part III, the regression results depicted in Figure 1 align with these
expectations. Relative to the 2002 cohort, the 2003 cohort exhibits a
roughly 5 percentage-point drop in its mean grant rate. The mean
grant rate of the 2004 cohort, in turn, drops a subsequent 1.5
percentage points relative to the 2003 cohort. As such, not only are
grant rates generally falling across all examiners as a result of these
cultural shifts—which we demonstrate via the estimated year fixed
effects presented in Figure 2—but the impact of the cultural
developments is especially felt by the new cohorts of examiners
entering the Agency at that time. All else being equal, the mean grant
rates of these burgeoning cohorts—comprised of impressionable,
fledgling examiners—are lower than that of previous cohorts. This is
further demonstrated by the year-by-year granting trends from 2002–
2012 set forth in Figure 3. It compares, by way of example, a cohort
emerging during the permissive 1993 regime with a cohort emerging
during a more restrictive environment of the mid-2000s. Although the
grant rates of the older cohorts did trend in the direction of these
cultural shifts in the 2000s, they experienced this downward trend
while nonetheless remaining at a higher general level than the
emerging cohorts. That is, although the grant rates of the 1993 cohort
are falling into the mid-2000s, once the mid-2000s cohorts enter the
scene, they emerge with a grant rate that remains consistently below
that of the 1993 cohort.
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Figure 3: Year-by-Year Grant-Rate Trend over 2002–2012 for 1993
Hiring Cohort (Permissive Culture) and 2005–2007 Hiring Cohorts
(Restrictive Cultures)

2002

2004

2006

Year

2008

2010

Cohort_1993

Cohort_2005

Cohort_2006

Cohort_2007

2012

Note: This figure compares annual grant rate trends for the first cohort in our records to
three cohorts in the mid-1990s using data from the 2002–2012 PAIR database.

As discussed in further detail in Part II, the 2010s were
associated with a retreat of the restrictive culture of the mid- to late2000s and a return to a more permissive environment. Similarly, not
only do we observe that grant rates generally increase across the
board after this time (as depicted by the estimated year effects in
Figure 2), but we also see from Figure 1 that the new cohorts of
examiners at this time start their careers on a higher grant-rate
pathway than those examiners who started in the mid-2000s. Due to
the time period of our study, it is difficult to say for sure without
having the benefit of foresight that these newer cohorts will maintain
this more permissive disposition if the environment becomes more
restrictive in the future.
In the Appendix, we estimate regression specifications that
group hiring cohorts into the three general bins characterized by the
three relevant cultural regimes. This grouping better facilitates an
assessment of the statistical significance of the above claims.
Specifically, this exercise suggests that the downward trend in
estimated cohort effects between the 1990s permissive era and the
mid- to late-2000s restrictive era is indeed statistically significant (at
the 1 percent level), as is the subsequent increase in cohort effects in

FRAKES AND WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

PATENT OFFICE COHORTS

4/21/2016 3:36 PM

1635

moving from the mid- to late-2000s to the post-2009 period (at the 5
percent level in the full specification with individual application
controls).
C. Magnifying Effect of Examiner Training Intensity
In Part II, we set forth the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The longer the amount of time new patent
examiners receive formal training, the more likely their grant rates will
reflect the allowance culture of the PTO at the time they were hired.
In other words, we further predicted that training has an
amplification effect on the role of culture in shaping long-term
practice styles. We first test this by looking at the new examiners
hired in 2006, a time, again, characterized by the restrictive granting
philosophy that was initially set forth in 2003–2004. Some of the new
hires at this time received the same level of training—that is, the twoweek program described in Part II—that was offered to new hires in
previous years. For these examiners, we may not predict much change
in their inherent granting patterns—that is, in their cohort effect—
relative to the 2004 and 2005 cohorts. New hires in certain
technological fields in 2006, however, were exposed to a novel,
extensive training period that lasted eight months. In light of the
substantially longer period of formal indoctrination in the prevailing
culture of the Agency, we predict that the mean grant rate of this
particular set of the 2006 cohort will fall even lower relative to the
2004 and 2005 cohorts and to that portion of the 2006 cohort that was
not subject to the new training program. The results presented in
Figure 4 are consistent with this prediction. In this new figure, we
modify the approach taken in Figure 1 to simply lay out two cohorts
in 2006: one subject to the new training initiative and one subject to
89
the prior training program. The 2006 cohort with extensive training
has a mean grant rate that is 2.3 percentage points (or roughly 3.4
percent) below the 2006 cohort that lacks the extensive formal
training. To facilitate an assessment of the statistical significance of
89. Technology-fixed effects should address any concerns that the results are attributable
to differences in grant-rate dynamics across technologies insofar as some technologies received
the new training in 2006 and some did not. In alternative specifications presented in the
Appendix, we show that these findings are robust to the alternative use of technology-by-year
fixed effects. Although the PTO did not randomly assign examiners into the new training
program, it appears as if they made these determinations on a technological basis. Given our
ability to control for this assignment feature (i.e., technology), the residual separation into the
new training group and the old training group can be viewed as effectively random.
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this estimate, we estimate a specification in the Appendix that
modifies the three-cohort-bin approach discussed above and breaks
the mid- to late-2000s cohorts into four groups: (1) between 2003 and
2006, (2) 2006 with the old training regime, (3) 2006 with the new
90
training regime, and (4) between 2007 and 2009. This exercise
demonstrates a statistically significant difference in mean grant rates
over their careers between the 2006 cohorts with and without the new
training program (at either a 10 percent or a 1 percent level of
significance depending on the precise specification).
Although only (roughly) half of the new hires in 2006 were
subject to the extensive new training program, all new hires in 2007
were subject to the eight-month training initiative. Accordingly, we
further predict that the mean grant rate for the 2007 cohort, all else
being equal, will fall even further relative to the prior cohorts. Figure
4 is likewise consistent with this prediction.
Accordingly, beyond demonstrating the general presence of
cohort effects themselves (Hypothesis 1), the findings presented in
Figures 1–4 also lend support to Hypotheses 2 and 3 and confirm that
the nature of the estimated effects are consistent with what one would
expect given the initial hiring conditions present in the relevant hiring
years.

90. Using those specifications with separate effects for each cohort year is arguably not
designed to conduct inference on the specific hypotheses posed by this Article, which do not
predict particular differences in cohort effects for each hiring year, but instead make predictions
across a coarser set of hiring years—for example, 1990s cohorts versus mid-2000s cohorts. Using
the standard errors from specifications with cohort effects for each hiring year is perhaps
unnecessarily taxing.

FRAKES AND WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

PATENT OFFICE COHORTS

4/21/2016 3:36 PM

1637

Figure 4: Estimation of Cohort Effects, Separating the 2006 Cohort
into an Old-Training 2006 Cohort and a New-Training 2006 Cohort

Note: This figure modifies Figure 1 to divide the 2006 cohort into two groups: one of
which was subject to the eight-month training program and one of which was subject to the prior
two-week training program. The 2006 cohort with the old training program is marked by the
first vertical dashed line from the left. The 2006 cohort with the new training program is marked
by the second vertical dashed line from the left.

D. Caveats
Finally, we should note an important caveat to our analysis. It is
possible that the documented cohort effects may be explained by
fluctuations over time in the type of individuals the PTO hires as
examiners—for example, in the mid-1990s, the PTO happened to hire
examiners that entered their positions with an inherently restrictive
granting philosophy, even before receiving any training. Such an
explanation would differ from the hypothesized story in which early
periods of training shape enduring granting philosophies and in which
fluctuations in Agency culture over time leave examiners of different
hiring cohorts on separate trajectories. Nevertheless, we believe there
are several reasons why our results are more consistent with the latter
than the former.
To start, our analysis does control for some fluctuations in the
type of patent examiners hired. For instance, technology-fixed effects
included in our base specification control for fluctuations in the
PTO’s technological-hiring preferences from year to year.
Technological shifts in hiring aside, it is conceivable that the
underlying pool of new hires changes as a function of the strength of
the overall labor market. That is, in the years when the
unemployment rate is high and the Agency faces less labor
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competition from industry, it is possible that the PTO hires new
examiners that are on average more competent. One might argue that
examiners with greater competency may be more effective at finding
and articulating bases of rejections and thus enter the PTO with a
lower baseline granting proclivity than patent examiners hired in
years when the unemployment rate is low and the PTO faces tighter
labor competition from industry. While plausible, we do not think it is
likely that our findings may be explained by fluctuations of this
nature in the labor market for several reasons.
First, changes in the unemployment rate do not generally align
with observed changes in the granting proclivities of patent office
91
cohorts in the way predicted by this alternative theory. For instance,
the unemployment rate was trending downwards from 1993 to 2001,
but cohort effects are largely flat during this time period. Likewise,
the unemployment rate was trending downwards in the mid-2000s
(from 2003 to 2008), despite our observation of falling—not rising—
cohort effects over this time period. Second, the results presented in
Figure 4 support the contention that the promulgation of Agency
culture through examiner training—not changes in labor markets—is
driving the granting proclivities of patent office cohorts. That is, the
fact that differences in the granting proclivities of examiners hired in
2006 can be explained in part by whether these examiners were
subjected to eight months of formal new hiring training or two weeks
of formal new hiring training cannot be explained by labor markets—
all examiners hired during 2006 were part of the same labor market
pool. The presence of credible training effects of this nature lends
greater credibility to the remaining findings as stemming from a story
in which early periods of training shape durable practice styles and in
which variations over time in top-down views over the proper
application of patentability standards determine variations in practice
styles across cohorts.
Finally, Figure 3 further supports this cohorts interpretation of
the results in lieu of the labor market alternative. As examiners from
the permissive cohorts of the 1990s proceeded into the mid-2000s—at
which time the Agency began calling for more restrictive practices—
they did indeed begin to grant at lower rates. The argument raised in
this Article—as supported by Figure 3—is that these reductions in

91. See Unemployment Rate, Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF LAB.
STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 27, 2016, 9:40 AM), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS140000
00 [http://perma.cc/4EBP-W7C9].
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rates were not as strong as they might have otherwise been absent the
hypothesized stickiness in examiner behavior (and thus did not go as
low as the rates of the cohort of new hires at that time). If the pattern
of cohort effects depicted in Figure 1 were to be explained by
fluctuations over time in the strength of the labor market, one would
not predict to observe any reductions in grant rates by the permissive
cohorts over this mid-2000s time period.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis demonstrates that the year in which an
examiner is hired by the PTO has a lasting effect on her granting
proclivities. The extent and direction of such cohort effects depends
on various conditions of the PTO at the time of hiring. Our analysis
intimates that the Agency’s allowance culture and new-hire training
play a potentially significant role in setting a cohort’s baseline
granting behavior. All else being equal, examiners that are hired in a
year in which the PTO’s allowance culture was more permissive
generally manifest a higher grant rate than examiners hired when the
Agency’s allowance culture was less permissive. In addition,
examiners subject to more intense formal new-hire training adhere
more closely to the prevailing allowance culture of the Agency in
developing their granting style than examiners subject to less intense
formal new-hire training. This part begins to explore the implications
of our results for both patent policy and administrative law more
generally.
A. Patent Policy
With respect to patent policy, our results are relevant to the
ongoing debates about patent quality—often expressed as a concern
over the allowance of invalid patents—and about inconsistent
patentability determinations across examiners. As an initial matter,
our analysis suggests that more attention should be paid to cohort
effects when discussing these critical policy considerations. If the PTO
wants to effectuate change in the Agency’s culture, including patentquality culture, it may need to direct more resources to certain
cohorts than others. At the least, it should acknowledge that the
presence of overlapping cohorts may limit the degree to which it can
achieve certain outcomes. Likewise, if the PTO wishes to better
harmonize examiner decisionmaking, it should recognize the
fundamental differences in how examiner cohorts exercise their
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discretion and tailor its initiatives in part by the year examiners are
hired.
Importantly, while demonstrating the role of cohort effects in
potentially interfering with the desire of Agency leaders to effectuate
change at the PTO at any particular point in time, the analysis also
suggests that current Agency leaders might wish to consider the
lasting effect of their short-term decisions on the future Agency. For
instance, consider a PTO that wishes to espouse a restrictive
approach to granting patents but that is under budgetary constraints
that limit its ability to conduct a robust training program at the
present time. Given its budgetary woes, this Office may wish to cut
back on its training expenses in an effort to align costs with expenses,
believing that it may be able to put the examiners corps back on track
at a later date. Our results suggest that its ability to correct matters
down the road may be more difficult than the Agency originally
believed, because examiners hired during the budgetary shortfall may
continue, in future years, to follow whatever styles they developed
during this initial period—a period characterized by a non-robust
training program. The PTO may ultimately have to commit more
resources than initially envisioned at a later date to redirect the
practice of examiners who received the non-robust new-hire training.
Understanding the potential additional costs associated with cohort
dynamics may change the Agency’s cost-benefit analysis as it
considers what policy initiatives to adopt.
Our results also have implications for the literature that
92
delineates inter-examiner disparity in PTO outcomes. Our results
suggest that the prevailing account that there are “as many patent
offices as there are patent examiners” is incomplete and
93
oversimplifies the current state of affairs. Most saliently, our results
suggest that a substantial portion of heterogeneity among examiners’
application outcomes is not simply idiosyncratic to individual
94
examiners, but instead is driven by cohort effects. Thus, although the
prior literature’s analysis may be helpful in encouraging
commentators not to overlook the role of individual examiner
heterogeneity in understanding the determinants of patent grants, our
92. See note 16 and accompanying text.
93. See Cockburn et al., supra note 9, at 21.
94. In a statistical exercise outlined in the Appendix, we find that roughly 20 percent of
variation in grant rates among examiners can be explained by individual examiner-fixed effects
alone. We also find that 20 percent of the variation in examiner-fixed effects are explained by
the cohorts to which the examiner belongs.
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analysis takes matters one step further by urging analysts not to
overlook the role of hiring cohorts in understanding what it is about
examiners that may be driving this heterogeneity. Recognizing that
the PTO is not comprised of examiners who make haphazard
decisions without substantial guidance from high-ranking officials, but
instead that examiner behavior is heavily shaped by Agency heads
through the environmental conditions of the Agency at hiring, likely
has additional payoffs. For instance, one of us has previously argued
that the prevalence of the overly simplified haphazard-examiner
account has resulted in the literature’s failure to appreciate the
Agency’s practical effect on the development of substantive patent
95
law.
B. Administrative State
Beyond patent policy, our results also have implications for the
administrative state more generally. The administrative-law literature
has long recognized that agencies are not monolithic actors but
instead are governed by complex internal decisional dynamics that
96
influence institutional outcomes. Yet, the administrative-law
scholarship has not fully appreciated the role that cohort effects may
play on agency decisionmaking, especially across a temporal
dimension.
As discussed above, cohort effects can inhibit current agency
leaders in effectuating policy changes while also acting to entrench
current policy into the future. That is, cohort effects raise the costs of
changing agency policy both contemporaneously and prospectively.
As a result, cohort effects, like the well-known “midnight”
regulations, provide agencies with another mechanism to entrench
97
policy horizontally across time. The study of cohort effects could
thus help us better understand the strategies that are available to
agencies seeking to achieve their interests. This is especially true in

95. Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 388 (2011).
96. For a discussion on the internal agency decisionmaking process, see generally
ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1964); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989).
97. See Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 969
(2003); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 891–92 (2008). Scholars have also recognized
how self-regulation can serve as an entrenchment mechanism. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency
Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 888 (2009).

FRAKES AND WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE)

1642

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/21/2016 3:36 PM

[Vol. 65:1601

light of the fact that cohort effects have several features that make
them distinct from other ways in which an agency may choose to
insulate its policy decisions from change. Perhaps most saliently,
cohort effects are less transparent than other tools by which an
agency may entrench its policy preferences against a future agency. In
contrast to entrenching policy by promulgating a legislative rule
interpreting the agency-administered statute before a regime change,
an agency may simply alter the training of its new employees to
ensure that certain types of its policy preferences have some staying
power. Cohort effects will then amplify the consequences of these
policies by providing a vehicle in which the effects of the policy will
continue to be appreciated even after the policy itself has been
98
terminated.
Additionally, a better understanding of cohort effects can help to
provide insight into the effectiveness of agency monitors. Congress
and the President have a variety of mechanisms with which they can
attempt to control agencies, including restricting the agency’s budget
99
and removing the agency’s high-ranking officials. Cohort effects can
help to increase our understanding about the effectiveness of these
external controls on agencies. As we have already discussed, cohort
effects can potentially blunt the ability of political principals or the
future agency to influence and control the agency’s behavior.
Whether this is a normatively desirable outcome necessarily depends
upon one’s view of administrative governance. Those who prize
accountability would likely find an agency’s ability to diminish
political controls troubling. Conversely, those who value agency
autonomy would likely view the constraint of political process
controls as a positive outcome.
CONCLUSION
Despite the general agreement that the PTO allows too many
low-quality patents and that its patentability decisions are
inconsistent across examiners, there exists little compelling evidence
as to what features of the system affect the Agency’s granting
behavior. As a result, policymakers have been trying to fix the patent

98. As noted earlier, cohort effects may be large in magnitude especially when employees
wield substantial discretion in performing their work functions.
99. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 42–44 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of
Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 610 (2010).
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system without understanding all of the root causes of its dysfunction.
This Article contributes to recent efforts by the Authors to rectify this
deficiency in the literature by exploring whether the year an examiner
was hired may help explain her granting proclivities. We find strong
evidence that hiring cohort effects do exist. Moreover, we find that
changes in PTO cohorts’ granting behavior align with changes in the
Agency’s culture and new hiring training programs. Our results
provide insight into pressing issues of patent policy. For instance, if
agency leaders want to diminish the degree of heterogeneity in patent
office outcomes across examiners, they might face at least some
degree of friction in light of the stickiness of examiner behavior. That
is, because agency culture and environment at the beginning of an
examiner’s employment may have an enduring effect on an
examiner’s granting style, a PTO that seeks to achieve such objectives
may need to tailor its policies to address differences in examiner
cohorts. Our results also provide insight into topics that have long
been of interest to scholars of the administrative state. Because
cohort effects raise the costs of changing agency policy today and in
the future, understanding how cohort dynamics work to entrench
agency policy over time also provides insight into the effectiveness of
agency monitors and the strategies available for an agency to achieve
its interests over a long-term horizon.
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APPENDIX
I. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
To test for the presence (and direction) of hiring-year cohort
effects, we estimate the following specification on the PAIR sample
described in Part III:
=

+
+

+

+
+

+
+

+

(1)

In this equation, a indexes the individual application, i indexes the
individual examiner, k indexes the technology associated with the
application, and t indexes the year in which the application is
indicates whether or not the
disposed of by the examiner.
given application was allowed by the examiner. Year-fixed effects are
captured by .
represents a set of dummy variables capturing
the incidence of the examiner assigned to the underlying application
falling into each of the general schedule (GS) pay-grade levels.
also includes separate categories for GS-13 without partial signatory
authority and GS-13 with partial signatory authority.
captures a set of dummy variables for the incidence of the relevant
examiner falling into a range of experience-level categories, where
experience captures the number of years at the time of the
application’s disposition that the relevant examiner has been with the
PTO (the specification of the experience ranges is discussed further
below). Further, we include a set of technology-fixed effects, , using
the thirty-seven technology subcategories set forth by Bronwyn Hall
100
and colleagues
(in other specifications, we include a set of
technology-by-year fixed effects). Other specifications include various
, including the
individual characteristics of the applications,
entity-size status of the applicant (large versus small) and the foreignpriority status of the application (previous filings at the European
Patent Office and the Japan Patent Office).

100. Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent-Citations
Data File: Lessons, Insights, and Methodological Tools, in PATENTS, CITATIONS, AND
INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 403, 452–54 tbl.9 (Adam B. Jaffe
& Manuel Trajtenberg eds., 2002).
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II. EXPERIENCE GROUPINGS
101

estimating
As explained extensively in our prior work,
cohort/individual effects in the face of both time/year effects and
age/experience effects poses certain econometric challenges due to
the well-known identity: “age + cohort = year.” In other words, if one
is looking at a given application and trying to understand what factors
determine the outcome of that application and one knows the hiring
year of the examiner in question and the number of years of
experience of the examiner in question at the time of disposal, then
one already has the information needed to understand what effect the
year of disposal has on the outcome of that application. How?
Because the year of disposal can immediately be gleaned from
knowing the precise hiring year and the precise number of years of
experience.
As such, it becomes hard to disentangle the separate
contributions of the experience of the examiner, the cohort of the
examiner, and the year of the disposal of the application—an exercise
we would like to do, considering that we are trying to isolate cohort
effects and distinguish them from experience effects and general time
trends. As we have discussed previously, researchers in these
contexts, provided they have a rich data source covering many years
of data with many overlapping cohorts, can attempt to achieve the
necessary separation by breaking the identity (age + cohort = year)
through the imposition of at least some additional normalization
restriction. Commonly, researchers will impose the necessary
restriction by grouping age/experience into bins—e.g., 0–1 years, 2–3
years, 4–5 years, and so on and so forth. By imposing such
restrictions, the researchers may retain some information by which
they can isolate individual hiring-year cohort effects. Consider, for
instance, an application disposed of in 2002 by examiners hired in
1997 and 1998. At this time, they have 4–5 years of experience. If we
tried to separately identify effects for 2002 disposals by examiners
with 4 years of experience (1998 hiring year) and 5 years of
experience (1997 hiring year), we could not do so for the above-stated
reasons. However, by grouping the experience effects into a 4–5 year
bin and estimating a mean effect for that bin, we retain some
information by which to separately identify a 1997 cohort effect and a
1998 cohort effect (by looking at deviations from the 4–5 year

101.

See generally Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6.
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experience mean). There is a cost to this approach, of course, in that
it implicitly assumes that the fact of gaining 4 years of experience has
an effect common with the fact of gaining 5 years of experience, when
in fact they may have different effects.
It should be emphasized that normalization restrictions other
than grouping into 2-year bins are also employed by researchers to
break the “age + cohort = year” identity, for instance, grouping
age/experience into a 0–1 year bin and then estimating individual age
effects thereafter, or using individual age/experience effects up to
some point and then censoring at some age and grouping all
individuals above that age into one group. In our Article we take this
latter approach, including separate dummy variables for examiners
who have 0, 1, 2 . . . 9 years of experience and then including a
dummy variable to indicate examiners with 10+ years of experience.
Because examiners falling into this 10+ years of experience group
spans a range of hiring years in our sample and a range of disposal
years, we are able to use these examiners to provide substantial
information to identify hiring-year and disposal-year effects (without
burdening us with separately identifying the various experience-year
effects beyond 10 years), providing us with some relief by which we
can separately identify individual experience effects for younger
experience levels. For instance, consider again applications reviewed
in 2002 by examiners starting in 1997 and 1998. Because we have
already specified experience levels in a way to truly break the “age +
cohort = year” identity (by grouping people with 10+ experience
years together), we have the ability elsewhere in the model to provide
information about the effect of 2002 disposals and the effect of 1997
and 1998 hiring years. We now have greater flexibility to use the
information from this particular set of applications to separately
identify the effect of 4 years of experience and 5 years of experience.
A benefit of achieving the necessary normalization restriction by
grouping together experience years beyond some censoring point at
the end of the experience distribution is that we may better estimate
the independent effects of early experience years. This may prove
useful given our desire to separate cohort effects from experience
effects near the end of our sample period (where experience is
naturally limited for new hires), a period of time where we attempt to
make one important inference—i.e., that the post-2009 cohorts have
higher granting tendencies than earlier cohorts.
Nonetheless, in this Appendix, we demonstrate the general
robustness of the main results to alternative normalization
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restrictions. In Figure A1, we replicate Figure 1 of the text but group
experience levels into 2-year bin dummies in the underlying
regression. The results demonstrate even stronger declines in mean
grant rates as cohorts age from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. This
figure, however, demonstrates a weaker increase in cohort means for
the post-2009 period. As above, however, with coarser experience
groupings of this nature, it is perhaps more difficult with this
specification to separate cohort effects from experience effects at the
end of the sample.

-0.10
-0.20
-0.30

Grant Rate at Cohort
Relative to 1993 Cohort

0.00

Figure A1: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring Year Cohort
of Associated Patent Examiner with Alternative Treatment of
Experience Groupings

1995

2000

2005

Cohort Year

2010

2015

Note: This figure replicates that of Figure 1, except that the experience group dummies
included in the regression are grouped into 2-year bins.
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III. TABULAR REGRESSION RESULTS
Table A1: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring Year Cohort
of Associated Patent Examiner
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Omitted: 1993 Cohort

—

—

—

—

1994 Cohort Dummy

-0.008
(0.019)

-0.011
(0.019)

-0.002
(0.015)

-0.007
(0.021)

1995 Cohort Dummy

0.003
(0.018)

-0.000
(0.018)

-0.010
(0.015)

0.008
(0.019)

1996 Cohort Dummy

0.011
(0.015)

0.008
(0.015)

0.016
(0.013)

0.011
(0.016)

1997 Cohort Dummy

0.006
(0.021)

0.002
(0.020)

-0.001
(0.017)

0.004
(0.022)

1998 Cohort Dummy

0.021
(0.018)

0.017
(0.018)

0.010
(0.016)

0.019
(0.020)

1999 Cohort Dummy

-0.002
(0.018)

-0.007
(0.018)

-0.011
(0.016)

-0.006
(0.020)

2000 Cohort Dummy

0.010
(0.020)

0.006
(0.019)

-0.014
(0.018)

0.006
(0.022)

2001 Cohort Dummy

0.010
(0.020)

0.005
(0.020)

-0.005
(0.017)

0.004
(0.022)

2002 Cohort Dummy

0.009
(0.020)

0.002
(0.020)

-0.014
(0.018)

0.004
(0.022)

2003 Cohort Dummy

-0.048**
(0.023)

-0.054**
(0.022)

-0.058***
(0.020)

-0.048**
(0.025)

2004 Cohort Dummy

-0.063***
(0.023)

-0.070***
(0.022)

-0.077***
(0.020)

-0.059**
(0.025)

2005 Cohort Dummy

-0.056**
(0.022)

-0.064***
(0.022)

-0.079***
(0.020)

-0.049**
(0.024)

2006 Cohort Dummy

-0.074***
(0.023)

-0.083***
(0.022)

-0.103***
(0.021)

-0.067***
(0.025)

2007 Cohort Dummy

-0.110***
(0.024)

-0.122***
(0.023)

-0.124***
(0.022)

-0.099***
(0.026)

2008 Cohort Dummy

-0.118***
(0.027)

-0.129***
(0.026)

-0.141***
(0.024)

-0.101***
(0.028)
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2009 Cohort Dummy

-0.107***
(0.026)

-0.122***
(0.026)

-0.129***
(0.024)

-0.091***
(0.028)

2010 Cohort Dummy

-0.098***
(0.028)

-0.119***
(0.027)

-0.130***
(0.026)

-0.077***
(0.030)

2011 Cohort Dummy

-0.033
(0.033)

-0.055*
(0.033)

-0.066**
(0.031)

-0.008
(0.035)

2012 Cohort Dummy

-0.036
(0.033)

-0.054*
(0.032)

-0.074**
(0.030)

-0.007
(0.034)

N

1148154

1148154

1148154

1014155

F statistic on Joint
Significance of Cohort
Dummies

9.24

10.20

10.14

6.67

P-value of F-test on Joint
Significance of Cohort
Dummies

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Technology Dummies
(Hall et al. Categories)?

YES

NO

NO

YES

Technology-by-Year
Dummies?

NO

YES

NO

NO

Technology Dummies
(PTO Classes)?

NO

NO

YES

NO

Individual Application
Covariates?

NO

NO

NO

YES

Examiner Grade Level
Dummies?

YES

YES

YES

YES

Examiner Experience
Group Dummies?

YES

YES

YES

YES

Examiner Tenure Group
Dummies?

YES

YES

YES

YES

Disposal Year Fixed
Effects?

YES

YES

YES

YES

* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to
correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is
a given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and
that was published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012.
Individual application covariates in Column (4) include an indicator for the
entity-size status of the applicant (large or small entity) and an indicator for
whether or not the application has foreign priority (whether it was previously
filed at the European Patent Office or Japan Patent Office).
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IV. SAMPLE BALANCE
One concern with the primary specification is that the
applications reviewed by examiners hired at the end of the sample
will generally be of the sort that are disposed of quickly by the PTO,
whereas those applications reviewed by the older cohorts may have
been disposed of over a range of durations, bearing in mind that the
average application in our sample spends nearly three years in
prosecution. Accordingly, despite random assignment of applications
to examiners, one may be concerned with the potential for some
degree of imbalance in the applications that we are assessing across
the different cohorts.
To alleviate this concern, we estimate specifications that
condition the sample on applications that were prosecuted to
disposition within 2 years, regardless of whether we are observing an
older hiring cohort or a newer hiring cohort. To achieve balance in
the recent years, we drop those examiners hired in 2012 from this
specification because they will not have had the opportunity to
examine applications in the 1+ year duration range. We also drop
observations disposed of in 2002, because those applications will also
represent (for all cohorts) quickly processed applications, to the
extent that the PAIR sample under investigation starts with
applications filed on or after March 2001. As demonstrated by Table
2, the results are robust for this alternative exercise. The findings hold
when conditioning the sample on applications reaching disposition
within 3 years, dropping both applications disposed of in 2002 and
2003, and applications reviewed by examiners hired in 2011 and
2012—for the reasons just identified (see Table A2).
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Table A2: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring Year Cohort
of Associated Patent Examiner, Balanced Sample Approach
(1)

(2)

Omitted: 1993 Cohort

—

—

1994 Cohort Dummy

0.012
(0.016)

-0.002
(0.019)

1995 Cohort Dummy

0.001
(0.019)

0.001
(0.019)

1996 Cohort Dummy

0.016
(0.014)

0.007
(0.015)

1997 Cohort Dummy

0.017
(0.020)

0.010
(0.021)

1998 Cohort Dummy

0.013
(0.018)

0.015
(0.019)

1999 Cohort Dummy

-0.013
(0.019)

-0.013
(0.019)

2000 Cohort Dummy

0.001
(0.021)

-0.013
(0.021)

2001 Cohort Dummy

-0.011
(0.022)

-0.022
(0.022)

2002 Cohort Dummy

-0.019
(0.022)

-0.033
(0.021)

2003 Cohort Dummy

-0.051*
(0.030)

-0.080***
(0.027)

2004 Cohort Dummy

-0.094***
(0.029)

-0.098***
(0.026)

2005 Cohort Dummy

-0.089***
(0.027)

-0.094***
(0.025)

2006 Cohort Dummy

-0.103***
(0.029)

-0.120***
(0.026)

2007 Cohort Dummy

-0.164***
(0.031)

-0.190***
(0.028)

2008 Cohort Dummy

-0.173***
(0.038)

-0.213***
(0.033)

2009 Cohort Dummy

-0.197***
(0.035)

-0.192***
(0.033)
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2010 Cohort Dummy

-0.215***
(0.042)

-0.200***
(0.033)

2011 Cohort Dummy

-0.103*
(0.063)

—

2012 Cohort Dummy

—

—

226148

478571

<= 2 Years

<= 3 Years

Examiner Grade Level Dummies?

YES

YES

Examiner Experience Group Dummies?

YES

YES

Examiner Tenure Group Dummies?

YES

YES

Disposal Year Fixed Effects?

YES

YES

N
Disposition Condition

* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent; *** Significant at 1
percent.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to
correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation
is a given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition
and was published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012,
subject to the stated prosecution duration restriction. Column (1) drops
applications disposed of in 1993 and by examiners hired in 2012, while Column
(2) drops applications disposed of in 1993 and by examiners hired in 2011 and
2012.

V. INFERENCE
The numerous hiring-year coefficients presented in Table A1 are
meant to be interpreted with reference to the omitted hiring-year
cohort—that is, the 1993 cohort. The specific hypotheses that we are
testing in this Article (beyond the general hypothesis of the presence
of cohort effects in the first instance, which can be assessed via the Ftests presented in Table A1) do not necessarily bear on the year-byyear comparisons that the standard errors in Table A1 may be
designed to facilitate. Rather we are seeking to compare grant rates
across a coarser divide of hiring-year cohorts, mainly pre-2003–2004
cohorts vs. mid- to late-2000 cohorts, and mid- to late-2000 cohorts vs.
post-2010 cohorts. In Table A3, we estimate specifications identical to
those estimated above, but we group hiring cohorts into three groups:
1993–2002 cohorts, 2005–2008 cohorts, and 2011–2012 cohorts. To
address concerns over how to specify the operable regime when the
quality-assurance initiatives driving our delineation of hiring-culture

FRAKES AND WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/21/2016 3:36 PM

PATENT OFFICE COHORTS

1653

eras are being rolled out, we drop those cohorts from the specification
that started at the PTO during the specific years marking the
transition across the relevant eras (2003 and 2004, 2009 and 2010),
allowing us to make steady-state comparisons across eras. In Column
(2) of Table A3, we control for the available individual application
covariates at our disposal (entity-size and foreign-priority status).
Table A3: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring Era Cohorts
(Omitting Transition Years)
(1)

(2)

—

—

-0.071***
(0.009)

-0.052***
(0.010)

Permissive Era II (2011+ Cohorts)

-0.042*
(0.023)

-0.003
(0.025)

N

999275

867867

P-value of Test: Restrictive Era vs. Permissive ERA II

0.15

0.02

Individual Application Covariates?

NO

YES

Technology Dummies (Hall et al. Categories)?

YES

YES

Examiner Grade Level Dummies?

YES

YES

Examiner Experience Group Dummies?

YES

YES

Examiner Tenure Group Dummies?

YES

YES

Disposal Year Fixed Effects?

YES

YES

Omitted: Permissive Era I (Pre-2003–2004 Cohorts)
Restrictive Era (2005–2008 Cohorts)

* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct
for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is a given
application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and was
published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012. Individual
application covariates in Column (2) include an indicator for the entity-size status
of the applicant (large or small entity) and an indicator for whether or not the
application has foreign priority (whether it was previously filed at the European
Patent Office or Japan Patent Office).

The final hypothesis that we test in this Article bears on the
effect of moving from a short, centralized training period of two
weeks to a robust, PTO-run training program of eight months in 2006,
with roughly half of the examiners in the 2006 cohort receiving the
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new training program and half receiving the old program (with
assignment based on technology, which we control for). Rather than
just comparing the grant rate of these two particular cohorts, we still
estimate an empirical specification on the full set of cohorts and
sample years, allowing us to achieve separation between year effects,
cohort effects, and experience effects while trying to isolate the
inherent granting tendencies of these two particular groups. As such,
we estimate specifications that modify the approach taken in Table
A3 to break the mid-2000s era into four separate groups: a 2005
cohort (a mid-2000 restrictive cohort purely under the old training
regime), a 2006 cohort under the old training regime (the 2006 cohort
control group), a 2006 cohort under the new training regime (the 2006
cohort treatment group), and the 2007 and 2008 cohorts (mid-2000
restrictive cohorts purely under the new training regime). We present
the results of this exercise in Table A4.
All else being equal, Tables A3 and A4 suggest a statistically
significant decline in mean grant rates between examiner cohorts
starting with the PTO in the mid-2000s and cohorts starting in the
prior period. They also suggest a statistically significant subsequent
increase in granting tendencies for the most recently hired cohorts
relative to the prior cohorts (note that Table A4 arguably allows for a
better test of this second comparison to the extent it allows for an
observation of how things change around the time of transition to the
recent permissive regime). Moreover, Table A4 demonstrates that the
2006 treatment cohort that was subjected to the new training program
had a lower grant rate relative to the 2006 control cohort that was not
subject to the new training program (statistically significant at the 10
percent level or 1 percent level depending on the specification),
consistent with expectations that the training would more strongly
induce new hires to adopt the prevailing views promulgated by the
agency heads at that time.
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Table A4: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring Era Cohorts
(Omitting Transition Years)
(1)

(2)

Omitted: Permissive Era I (Pre-2003–2004 Cohorts)

—

—

Restrictive Era Old Training Regime (2005 Cohort)

-0.064***
(0.011)

-0.049***
(0.011)

2006 Cohort under Old Training Regime

-0.074***
(0.013)

-0.057***
(0.014)

2006 Cohort under New Training Regime

-0.097***
(0.012)

-0.087***
(0.013)

Restrictive Era New Training Regime (2007–2008
Cohorts)

-0.122***
(0.012)

-0.102***
(0.013)

Permissive Era II (2011+ Cohorts)

-0.065***
(0.023)

-0.031
(0.024)

999275

867867

P-value of Test: 2006 Cohort under Old Training
Regime vs. 2006 Cohort under New Training Regime

0.06

0.01

P-value of Test: Restrictive Era New Training Regime
vs. Permissive Era II

0.01

0.00

Individual Application Covariates?

NO

YES

Technology Dummies (Hall et al. Categories)?

YES

YES

Examiner Grade Level Dummies?

YES

YES

Examiner Experience Group Dummies?

YES

YES

Examiner Tenure Group Dummies?

YES

YES

Disposal Year Fixed Effects?

YES

YES

N

* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to
correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is
a given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and
that was published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012.
Individual application covariates in Column (2) include an indicator for the
entity-size status of the applicant (large or small entity) and an indicator for
whether or not the application has foreign priority (whether it was previously
filed at the European Patent Office or Japan Patent Office).

